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Henry IV is one of the few historical figures whose 
military reputation rests on the fact that he operated 
successfully during the course of his life at all definable 
levels of military command: as a soldier and partisan 
leader, a battlefield tactician, a campaigner, and a national 
strategist. He fought in over two hundred engagements, 
never lost a battle, and was the major victor in four 
landmark battles. Nevertheless, until recently most 
judgments by French, British, and American historians, 
scholars like Pierre de Vaissière, Sir Charles Oman, Lynn 
Montross, and David Buisseret, have portrayed Henry IV 
not as a great military commander, but as a risk-taking 
opportunist, always the Vert Galant in the guise of a skilled 
tactician and cavalryman. He has been condemned as a 
casual strategist who was often too shortsighted to take full 
advantage of his successes. Even Buisseret, a historian who 
                                                
* This paper is dedicated to the memory of Craig M. Cameron, a 
social and cultural military historian whose life ended tragically on 30 
December 2004 at the age of forty-six. At the time of his death he was 
working on a manuscript examining civil-military relations in the 
United States during the era of the Vietnam War. I knew him as my 
colleague in the Department of History at Old Dominion University 
from the time of my arrival in 1991 until his death. Along the way I 
learned a great deal from his vision of military history. 
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clearly likes Henry and produced a biography in the 1980s 
that emphasized his military prowess, dismissed him in the 
end as a "poor strategist."1 This negative, or at best 
lukewarm, evaluation of Henry IV reflects assumptions by 
French historians, military historians, and military scientists 
that are based chiefly on post-Westphalian logic which 
views decisive battle and military objectives in the context 
of modern warfare between nation-states. More recently, 
however, scholars like Ronald S. Love have begun to place 
early modern warfare into a paradigm that perceives war, 
warfare, and military operations as social and political 
phenomena not restricted by or to states and not necessarily 
the preserve of rational actors with strictly defined 
battlefield goals. In the process, they have put history back 
into military history. This new perception of conflict and 
military engagements lends itself to a revised evaluation of 
Henry IV as a military commander and highlights his 
                                                
1 I want to thank Terence Loveridge for allowing me to restate on 
pages 1-6 of this paper words and ideas from an unpublished paper we 
jointly authored entitled "Besieging France: Henry IV as a Military 
Commander." David Buisseret, Henry IV (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1984), 25, 35. See also Edgard Boutaric, Institutions militaires 
de la France avant les armées permanentes suivies d'un aperçu des 
principaux changements survenus jusqu'à nos jours dans la formation 
de l'armée (Paris: H. Plon, 1863), 345; Charles W. C. Oman, A History 
of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (New York: E. P. Dutton & 
Company, 1937), 505; Lynn Montross, War through the Ages (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 244; Pierre de Vaissière, Henri IV 
(Paris: A. Fayard, 1928), 303; and Daniele Thomas, Henri IV, Images 
d'un roi entre realité et mythe (Paris: Héraclès, 1992), 343. For more 
positive views of Henry as a military commander see Ronald S. Love, 
"All the King's Horsemen: The Equestrian Army of Henry IV," 
Sixteenth Century Journal 22:3 (1991): 511-33; idem., "Henri IV et 
Ivry, Le Monarque Chef de Guerre," Revue historique des armées 1 
(1991): 11-20; and Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 207-9. 
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genius as a general who understood that pressing the 
advantages of a particular battle was not as important as 
winning the war.  
In this contribution to the small but growing revisionist 
literature on Henry IV as a military commander, I build on 
the work of Ron Love, who along with the French historian 
Christian Desplat, has mastered an understanding of both 
Henry IV's military role and his political objectives. Love 
and Desplat both explain how Henry's two agendas 
overlapped, and they emphasize that Henry spent most of 
the religious wars engaged in a civil conflict with his own 
people. This protracted battle involved Henry in 
complicated civil-military relations since the ultimate 
outcome of his military command after 1589 was to gain 
him the acceptance of the very people he considered his 
sons and daughters. The situation, Desplat concludes, lent 
itself more to compromise than to radical solution.2 Henry 
had to convince those he was fighting of his legitimacy as 
king and win their consent to rule. His military decisions, 
skirmishes, sieges, set battles, and campaigns were directly 
connected to maintaining his course through the political, 
religious, and social issues surrounding the civil wars. This 
long-term strategic vision ultimately won him the throne. In 
the process, he revealed himself to be not only an expert 
employer of his century's newest technologies, but also as 
Terrence Loveridge has shown, a master of information 
dominance.3 Henry well understood that he was not 
fighting simply to win battles but to forge a lasting peace. 
                                                
2 Christain Desplat, "Henri IV le soldat et le capitaine," in 
Avènement d'Henri IV. Quatrième Centenaire de la bataille de Coutras, 
Volume des actes du colloque Coutras, 16-18 octobre 1987 (Pau: J & D 
Éditions, 1989), 90. 
3 Terence Loveridge, "Henry IV as a Military Commander" (M.A. 
thesis, Old Dominon University, 1999). 
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His harshest critics tended to assume that conquest of a 
kingdom was his goal when, in fact, his desired end was the 
willing consolidation of his realm under his stewardship.4 
Thus Henry could not starve Paris into submission during 
the 1590 siege of the city and left the ramparts to pursue the 
duke of Parma instead.5 On hearing this news, Henry's ally, 
Elizabeth I of England, sent an angry letter to the Bourbon 
king chastising his behavior.6 From a psychological point 
of view, however, Henry's strategy helped to secure the 
capitulation of his capital in 1594.  
In assessing the historiography of Henry IV as a 
military commander, I will first discuss a few of his 
military accomplishments. Next I will ponder why someone 
who was so successful in battle has been so uniformly 
condemned. Finally I will tackle the "but why" question 
and argue that historians have wrongly perpetuated a 
historiographic legacy in which Henry as a military 
commander is conflated with Henry as the Vert Galant. The 
origin of this conflation can be found in the very self-
                                                
4 For contemporary evidence see Henry's manifesto of 4 Mar. 
1589: Henri IV, Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV, ed. Jules 
Berger de Xivrey, 7 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-58), 2:443-
58. 
5 "Bref Traité des Misères de la Ville de Paris," in Archives 
Curieuses de l'Histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusqu'à Louis XVIII, 
eds. M. L. Cimber and F. Danjou (Paris: Membres de l'Institut 
Historique, 1837), Ser. I, 13:277-8, 281-2; Filippo Pigafetta, Relation 
du Siège de Paris par Henri IV, trans. A. Dufour (Paris: Société de 
l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France, 1875); and Nancy Lyman 
Roelker, ed., The Paris of Henry of Navarre as seen by Pierre de 
l'Éstoile, Selection from his Mémoires-Journaux (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1958), 190-1. 
6 Recueil des Lettres Missives, 3:284-5; and R. B. Wernham, 
"Elizabethan War Aims and Strategy," in Elizabethan Government and 
Society: Essays presented to Sir John Neale, eds. S. T. Bindoff, J. 
Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (London: Athlone Press, 1961), 354.  
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fashioning that the king promoted in his own lifetime: 
Henry as both a valiant warrior and an inexhaustible lover. 
 
Henry IV's military 
accomplishments and so-called failures 
Contemporaries acknowledged that Henry possessed a 
keen eye for ground of tactical importance and a 
remarkable sense of the tempo, pulse, and patterns of battle. 
An early chronicler of the religious wars, Enrico Davila, 
wrote in the seventeenth century that Henry could appear 
and disappear on the battlefield "like lightning," meaning 
Henry had his own brand of "shock and awe" based on 
superb use of sixteenth-century tactics and technology. 
David Buisseret credits Henry with perfecting a tactic 
known as the pistolade in which his cavalry fired their 
pistols only after coming into close contact with the enemy 
at which point Henry's forces charged with their swords. 
Henry also rejected the medieval gendarme or horse-
mounted, armored knight and relied instead on a new kind 
of cavalry soldier called the arquebusier-à-cheval, the 
forerunner of the seventeenth-century dragoon. He 
achieved remarkable success by combining the use of 
infantry armed with pike and firearm with artillery and 
light cavalry. Posting musketeers between cavalry 
squadrons seems to have been an original idea with Henry. 
Perfecting a Huguenot ambush tactic that delivered a 
counter-punch attack, he ordered his musketeers to fire in 
volleys from multiple ranks and at point blank range into 
the flank of the enemy.7 Henry was also open to innovation 
and established a number of adapted tactical and 
administrative measures that soon became standard within 
Europe. He was one of the first commanders in Europe to 
                                                
7 Oman, 474.  
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use common colors among his troops that did not privilege 
noble captains over common soldiers.8 He developed his 
corps of engineers and had them build impressive systems 
of fortresses and trenches when besieging cites, and he 
produced the first army field hospital recorded in French 
history at the 1597 siege of Amiens.9 He experimented with 
new technologies and, according to Christopher Duffy, may 
well have invented the petard.10 Additionally, Henry was 
not only interested in taking advantage of the printing press 
to propagandize his quest for the throne, he also 
experimented with map-making. In 1590 he ordered 
Jacques Fougeu, a lodging-master with his army, to prepare 
maps that would aid the billeting of troops.11 Fougeu 
produced over five hundred maps during his tenure with 
Henry IV, advancing the science of military cartography in 
the process.12  
                                                
8 Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: 
Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 97; Thomas F. Arnold, Renaissance at War, 
(London: Cassel & Company, 2001), 86-7; and Hugh Thomas, History 
of the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 200. 
9 David Buisseret, "Henri IV et l'art militaire," in Henri IV le roi et 
la reconstruction du royaume, Volumes des actes du colloque Pau-
Nêrac 14-17 septembre 1989, ed. Pierre Tucoo-Chala (Pau: J & D 
Editions, 1990), 338-40; and Baron Xavier de Bonnault d'Houët, La 
Première Ambulance sous Henri IV (Paris: A. Picard, 1919), 14-5.  
10 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early 
Modern World, 1494-1660 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), 111. 
11 Joel Kovarsky, "Maps in a Time of War, The Rise of European 
Military Cartography," Mercator's World 7 (May/June 2002): 32. 
12 David Buisseret, ed., Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The 
Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern 
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 107-8. Buisseret 
explains that little is known of military cartography in France before 
Fougeu. Sully ran a workshop for cartographers during his life, but 
little is known either about this endeavor (111). See also David 
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Even while acknowledging these innovations and 
achievements, military historians virtually always berate 
Henry IV for misuse of his battlefield successes and for 
personal recklessness. For example, Henry has been 
repeatedly criticized since the sixteenth century for a 
perceived failure to exploit his first major victory at the 
battle of Coutras in 1587. Numerous historians have 
criticized him for failing after defeating the duke of 
Joyeuse to take his army straightaway to meet up with a 
nearby force of 34,000 German and Swiss troops to march 
on Paris and force battle on Henry III.13 Even Henry of 
Navarre's ally and close confident the baron of Rosny (later 
duke of Sully) wrote that the advantage of Coutras "floated 
away like smoke on the wind."14 A more recent critic, Sir 
Charles Oman, one of England's most distinguished 
military historians in the first half of the twentieth century, 
used Coutras and other post-battle actions to label Henry 
"the most inconsequent and the most un-Napoleonic of 
generals."15 The oft-repeated story with regard to Coutras 
goes that after the battle Henry galloped away in the 
direction of Béarn to lay the captured standards from his 
victory at the feet of his mistress, Corisande d'Andoins.16  
Ronald S. Love rejects this assessment of Coutras in an 
article published in 1999, in which he underscores that one 
cannot separate Henry's military campaigns from his 
political goals. In this example Love supports an analysis of 
                                                                                              
Buisseret, The Mapmakers' Quest: Depicting New Worlds in 
Renaissance Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 139. 
13 For example, Buisseret, Henry IV, 25; and Thomas, Henri IV, 
343. 
14 Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Les Oeconomies royales 
de Sully, eds. David Buisseret and Bernard Barbiche, vol. 1, 1572-1594 
(Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1970), 193. 
15Oman, 505. 
16 Buisseret, Henry IV, 25. 
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the aftermath of Coutras first expounded by Garrett 
Mattingly in 1959, although both historians are indebted to 
Father Hardouin de Beaumont de Péréfixe's seventeeth-
century assessment of the battle.17 Péréfixe, Mattingly, and 
Love all argue that Henry of Navarre had nothing to gain in 
1587 by engaging Henry III in battle. Aside from the fact 
that Henry's army was tired and in need of rest, the army of 
Henry III actually blocked the Loire River at that time. 
Engaging the Valois king's army might actually have 
strengthened the Guise-led Catholic League, a situation that 
would have destroyed any hopes Navarre had for an 
eventual alliance with Henry III to defeat the League. 
Coutras occurred before the Day of the Barricades when 
Henry III fled Paris and was discredited in the eyes of his 
subjects. The strategy in place in 1587 thus mandated that it 
was more important for Henry of Navarre to appear to be a 
Calvinist war leader who was loyal to Henry III and intent 
on defeating the Guise threat to the realm.18 Love argues, 
"But from Navarre's much broader political perspective, 
restoring the integrity of his campaign to win the Valois 
monarch was more important than securing his short-term 
military gains."19  
Henry has also been criticized for his rash behavior as a 
soldier-king, for taking the lead in battle and so often 
putting himself in harm's way. His allies warned that the 
Protestant cause would collapse without him, and after 
                                                
17 Hardouin de Beaumont de Péréfixe, Histoire de Henri-le- 
Grand, Roi de France et de Navarre Suivie d'nn Recueil de Quelques 
Belles Actions et Paroles Mémorables de ce Prince (Paris: Edme 
Martin, 1661), 78. 
18Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1959), 159-60; and Ronald S. Love, "A Game of Cat and Mouse: Henri 
de Navarre and the Huguenot Campaigns of 1584-89," Canadian 
Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d'histoire 24 (1999): 1, 16-20.  
19 Love, "A Game," 20.  
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1589 his ministers frequently chastised him for his reckless 
pursuit of valor. More recently Edmund Dickerman and 
Anita Walker have echoed these sentiments by noting that 
Henry seemed oblivious to the fact that every risk he took 
compromised the future stability of France.20 But Henry 
had good practical reasons for wanting to take the lead in 
battle. The nobles in Henry's army, in particular, needed 
frequent reminders that he was one of them and their 
leader. He certainly knew as well that many of his 
cavalrymen were not competent to command critical wings 
of his unique force. Additionally, where Henry was not 
personally involved, plans had a way of unraveling. At the 
battle of Ivry his own squadron began to break up when he 
was believed dead and only reassembled in the heat of 
battle at his desperate urging. Even after victory was 
achieved, post-battle jubilation was subdued until Henry 
returned from the field and removed his helmet to prove he 
was still alive.21 Henry's victories were personal; he was 
the cause for whom his troops fought. Christian Desplat 
states, "With Henry IV, the king of France was rebaptized 
as the first soldier of the realm; the function of monarchy 
had thus returned to its original purpose."22 Accepting the 
totality of his monarchical heritage, Henry as warrior 
became the embodiment of the state long before his 
grandson made the claim.23 His kingly acts of clemency to 
survivors, rewards to victors, and gentle admonitions to 
those who failed to follow him were meaningless without 
his personal role in battle. In this light, Henry actually 
                                                
20 Edmund H. Dickerman and Anita M. Walker, "The Choice of 
Hercules: Henry IV as Hero," The Historical Journal 39:2 (1996): 323.  
21 H. C. Davila, The Historie of the Civill Warres of France 
(London: R. Roworth, 1647), 902-3. 
22 Desplat, 96. 
23 Ibid. 
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embodies what John Keegan calls "heroic leadership" and 
echoes the exemplary risk-taking and raw courage of 
Alexander the Great.24 
 
The Vert Galant as "great general" 
In Love's 1999 article he identifies a four-hundred-year-
old tradition of criticism of Henry IV as a military leader 
that he traces to two derogatory quips that Alexander, the 
duke of Parma, made about the king's actions in battle. 
Love argues that historians have uncritically accepted 
Parma's version of Henry IV ever since. "Consequently," 
Love states, "their [historians'] treatments of Henry IV as a 
military leader, and especially as a strategist – the major 
focus of their disdain – are superficial and repetitive, and 
never consider, or grapple with accompanying conditions 
or the king's ultimate political objectives."25 Another 
sixteenth-century anecdote, the story of Henry leaving the 
battlefield at Coutras to join his lover, Corisande 
d'Andoins, has similarly been told and retold by historians 
to deride Henry's strategic sense. Instead of identifying the 
master design in Henry's suspect military decisions, 
however, my intent is to explore the anecdote about 
Henry's post-Coutras behavior in order to show how 
historians have conflated Henry's battlefield prowess with 
his oversized libido. 
The 20 October 1587 battle of Coutras was Henry's first 
major victory. As was typical of almost all his military 
engagements, Henry faced a much larger army than his 
own: Joyeuse commanded a force of 10,000 versus Henry's 
                                                
24 John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking, 
1987), 10-1. 
25 Ronald S. Love, "Henry IV and Ivry Revisited: The King as a 
Military Leader," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western 
Society for French History 11 (1984): 65. 
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6,300 troops. Nevertheless, the Huguenot commander 
maneuvered his men into a defensive position, alternating 
his troop lines with musketeers and cleverly ordering his 
front ranks to kneel. Henry's plan worked so well that 
within ten minutes Joyeuse's army was in disarray. The 
battle ended less than an hour after it began. Joyeuse and 
some 2,500 of his men were killed in that short span of 
time while Henry lost less than 500.26 "At least," Henry 
supposedly quipped, "nobody will be able to say after this 
that we Huguenots never win a battle."27 At this point, the 
master narrative goes, the man who in so many other 
situations proved to be a consummate opportunist 
impulsively left his band of brothers to go find his lover. 
Agrippa d'Aubigné seems to have publicized this 
anecdote first around 1616 in the publication of his Histoire 
Universelle. Aubigné mentions that Henry went to 
Corisande and concludes that in doing so he threw "all his 
words to the wind and gave up his victory to love."28 The 
duke of Sully echoed this same sentiment in his 
Oeconomies Royales.29 After Henry's unexpected death, the 
story about his post-battle method for relieving stress must 
have circulated in popular discourse as the legend of his 
greatness grew. During the reign of Louis XIV a man 
known as Tallemant des Réaux entertained people in the 
salons with stories about Henry's penchant for leaving his 
armies to pursue his mistresses. These stories eventually 
                                                
26 Estimates vary as to how many men were lost at the battle of 
Coutras: Oman, 473-80; Montross, 242-3; and Buisseret, Henry IV, 24-
5.  
27 Quoted in Mattingly, 157. 
28 Théodore-Agrippa d'Aubigné, Histoire Universelle, ed. 
Alphonse de Ruble (Paris: Librarie Renouard, 1893), 7:161. The work 
was originally published between 1616 and 1620. 
29 Sully, 195-6. See as well Recueil des Lettres Missives, 2:602-3. 
Sully's work was first published in 1638. 
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found their way into racy accounts of Henry's sex life 
produced in works like Les Amours de Henri IV published 
in the Netherlands in the 1665. By the time François-Eudes 
de Mézeray produced a critical summary of Henry's reign 
in the 1680s, the essential notion that throughout Henry's 
life his sex drive always overpowered his rational thinking 
was already the stuff of legend.30 Thus, when analyzing the 
battle of Coutras, nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
historians, especially military historians, drew uncritically 
on a long tradition of evaluating Henry's battlefield 
command from the perspective of his sexual persona. The 
impact of this misconception was so damaging that it has 
obscured historical understanding of his military leadership 
ever since. 
The story of Henry and his post-Coutras exploits is 
actually quite complex. Eight days after the battle, Henry 
did in fact quickly leave his disintegrating army in the 
hands of the Prince of Condé and set out for Pau where he 
spent much of November in the company of Diane 
d'Andoins, countess of Guiche and Gramont (1555-1621).31 
By that time Diane had already taken to calling herself 
Corisande, an affectation she probably took from her deep 
interest in chivalric literature. She welcomed Henry, whom 
she affectionately dubbed "Petiot," a friend she had known 
all of her life and whom she had taken as a lover after the 
death of her husband in 1580. Contemporaries considered 
the young widow eccentric. She favored grotesque colors in 
her retinue and collected a menagerie of wild animals. She 
                                                
30Taken from J. H. M. Salmon, "The Afterlife of Henry of 
Navarre," History Today 47:10 (1997): 13-4.  
31 There are several letters from Henry to Corisande dated Dec. 
1587 and Jan. 1588 in the Recueil des Lettres Missives, 2:318-9, 330-3. 
 The Faux pas of a Vert galant 
Volume 33 (2005) 
91 
had a flair for poetry and perhaps other hidden talents that 
Henry readily indulged.32  
The infamous vignette concerning Henry and Corisande 
involves the flags and pennants from the battle of Coutras. 
Whether he actually took twenty-two captured standards 
and other souvenirs from the battle and laid them at the feet 
of his lover is hard to say. In one sense it was a great 
romantic move in keeping with her love of chivalry. But 
the story also has a slightly odd, even kinky, flavor. It 
conjures up images of Henry in post-battle heat rolling in 
the arms of Corisande on the flags of the vanquished, 
rendering perverse the very symbols of their military honor. 
In reality, if the story of the flags is true, it was probably a 
gallant gesture of thanks on Henry's part to the 
noblewoman who supported his cause at Coutras with both 
money and troops. It may even be a symbolic story 
emphasizing a chivalric Henry who did not butcher his 
prisoners after the battle, misdeeds for which Joyeuse was 
notorious, nor extract ransoms from them. Instead he 
honorably freed those captured during the fight. In this 
sense he had acted as a true chevalier and offered himself 
to la belle Corisande as the ideal warrior-hero. In the hands 
of historians, however, the story of Henry and Corisande 
has become an indicator of the future king's supposed 
failure to capitalize on victory and a trope for his flawed 
military vision.  
This misreading of Henry and his strategic brilliance is 
due in part to the king's own efforts to fashion his heroic 
                                                
32 George Edward Slocombe, Henri IV (Paris: Payot, 1933), 116; 
Daniele Thomas, 349; and idem., Henri IV et la reconstruction du 
royaume (Pau: Editions de la Réunion des musées, 1989), 212, image 
262 ("Diane d'Andoins, comtesse de Guiche et sa fille, Catherine de 
Gramont"). For more on Corisande see Raymond Ritter, Cette grande 
Corisande (Paris: A. Michel, 1936). 
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persona in the guise of a magnificent lover. Henry was his 
own best promoter, and he encouraged the development of 
political propaganda that portrayed him as the emblematic 
warrior-hero. Edmund Dickerman and Anita Walker 
acknowledge that "[w]ar remained the activity he most 
valued; his identity as warrior the core-constituent of his 
self-image."33 Yet his reputation as a lover of extraordinary 
abilities was also juxtaposed or implied in the countless 
artistic renderings of his likeness as Hercules produced 
during his reign.34 References to his dynamic sexual energy 
persisted even after the old king began to experience bouts 
of impotence late in his reign.35 Katherine B. Crawford 
argues that this duality in Henry's representation as hero 
and lover spanned his entire reign and grew out of his 
complex sexual behavior which contemporaries witnessed 
from time to time.36 It was good propaganda to juxtapose 
Henry IV's virility with Henry's III's impotence, but at other 
times the king's sexual behavior seemed dangerously out of 
control; for instance, his designs to marry Gabrielle 
d'Estrées in 1598 or his pursuit of Charlotte de 
Montmorency in 1610.37 In a nuanced reading of the 
iconography of Henry's reign, Crawford underscores that 
the very masculine images of the king also contained 
intertextual tensions that posited counter-images. She 
argues, "The assertions of self-control and heroic masculine 
                                                
33 Dickerman and Walker, 325.  
34 Ibid., 315-37.  
35 Edmund Dickerman, "Henry IV and the Juliers-Clèves Crisis: 
The Psychohistorical Aspects," French Historical Studies 8:4 (1974): 
635-7. 
36 Katherine B. Crawford, "The Politics of Promiscuity: 
Masculinity and Heroic Representation at the Court of Henry IV," 
French Historical Studies 26:2 (2003): 225-52. 
37 Ibid., 225.  
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comportment always contained the specter of incipient 
sexual disorder."38  
It is worth considering that the historiography of Henry 
IV as a military leader has been too heavily influenced by a 
popular tradition that focuses, somewhat proudly in modern 
France, on Henry IV as a consummate lover and 
womanizer. In part Henry's own self-promotion inspired 
this tradition. It also derives from a historiographic 
tendency to read his ability as a military leader from 1568, 
when he took up his first command, to 1598, when he 
signed the Peace of Vervins and ended the religious wars, 
from the perspective and sexual antics of his entire life, 
particularly the post-1598 period. Thus, the story of his 
post-Coutras behavior seems all the more believable when 
it is read in the context of his life-long sexual license; 
knowing, for example, that he and Marie de Médicis fought 
bitterly over his desires to bring all his bastard offspring to 
the Louvre to live with the royal couple and their legitimate 
children. 
If this is indeed the case, it seems obvious that a re-
evaluation of Henry IV as a military commander is in 
order. Thus, as David Trim argues in a very recent 
reassessment of Henry's martial abilities: "The vert-galant 
was indeed a "demon de batailles."39 His military successes 
and the image they created in the minds of his people 
explain his successful rule. Henry devised a long-term 
strategy for winning the throne and implemented that 
strategic plan while he personally led his men into battle. 
                                                
38 Ibid., 252. 
39 David Trim, "Edict of Nantes: Product of Military Success or 
Failure?" in The Adventure of Religious Pluralism in Early Modern 
France, Papers from the Exeter Conference, April 1999, eds. Keith 
Cameron, Mark Greengrass, and Penny Roberts (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2000), 97.  
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Henry won his kingdom on the battlefields of France and as 
a result brought peace to his realm. In the context of 
military history, that fact alone should be the key indicator 
in any judgment of Henry IV as a military commander. 
